

Public Economics

Problem set 2

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Exercise 1

Let us consider an economy populated by 2 consumers—A and B—who are endowed with 1 unit of income and derive utility from the consumption of a private good x and a pure public good G. Individual i utility function is given by:

$$U^i = \log(x_i) + \log(G),$$

where $x_i = 1 - g_i$ denotes consumption of the private good by consumer *i*, and $G = g_A + g_B$ is the total quantity public good that is produced from individuals contributions.

- 1. Determine individual A's private provision of the public good when considering g_B as given.
- 2. Determine individual B's private provision of the public good when considering g_A as given.
- 3. Use the two reaction functions to find G^* , the quantity of public good that is supplied at the Nash equilibrium.
- 4. Determine \bar{G} , the efficient level of public good provision. Contrast it with the decentralized equilibrium.
- 5. Show that producing \overline{G} is Pareto-superior to producing G^* .
- 6. Show that private contribution required to produce \overline{G} cannot be sustained without the intervention of some third party that would be able to constrain individuals' contributions.

Exercise 2

Let us consider an economy populated by 2 individuals—A and B—who consume 2 goods—1 and 2. Individuals' utility function are:

$$\begin{aligned} U^A &= \log(x_1^A) + x_2^A - \frac{1}{2}\log(x_1^B), \\ & \text{and,} \\ U^B &= \log(x_1^B) + x_2^B - \frac{1}{2}\log(x_1^A), \end{aligned}$$

where x_j^i is the quantity of good *j* consumed by individual *i*. Each individual is endowed with 1 unit of income. Let the unit prices of both goods be 1.



- 1. Calculate the decentralized equilibrium situation of this economy.
- 2. Calculate the social optimum if the social welfare function is the sum of individuals' utility functions.
- 3. Check that the social optimum is Pareto-superior to the decentralized one.
- 4. Show that the social optimum can be reached in a decentralized framework thanks to a tax t placed on good 1 (so, the price of this good is now 1 + t), with the tax revenues returned equally to consumers via a lump-sum transfer T.